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THE STATE OP UTAHf 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
RICHARD LYNN WRIGHT, 
Defendant -Appel lan t . 
Case No. 2 07 46 
AMENDED BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
Respondent, S t a t e of Utah, f i l e d i t s i n i t i a l b r i e f in 
t h i s case on December 12 , 1985, and a s s e r t e d jjit£X . a l i a t h a t 
a p p e l l a n t had f a i l e d t o provide an adequate record on appeal t o 
allow t h i s Court t o a d d r e s s the m e r i t s of a p p e l l a n t ' s speedy 
t r i a l c l a ims . This a s s e r t i o n was based, in p a r t , on a p p e l l a n t ' s 
f a i l u r e to provide a t r a n s c r i p t of a March 22 , 1986 hea r ing on a 
p r e - t r i a l motion t o d i smiss wherein a p p e l l a n t ' s speedy t r i a l 
c la ims were f i r s t p re sen ted t o the lower c o u r t . 
On January 27 , 1986, a f t e r Respondent ' s b r i e f was 
f i l e d , a p p e l l a n t , wi thout l eave of cour t and wi thout n o t i c e to 
respondent , f i l e d with t h i s Court t h e t r a n s c r i p t of the p r e - t r i a l 
hea r ing ( h e r e i n a f t e r des igna ted as " T 2 . " ) . Respondent l e a r n e d of 
t he supplementa t ion of t he record on February 1 1 , 1986, two days 
before the scheduled o ra l argument of t h i s c a s e . Because of t h i s 
development, t h e p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d and t h e Court ordered t h a t 
(1) the supplemental t r a n s c r i p t could be made p a r t of t he record 
on a p p e a l ; (2) t h e respondent could f i l e an amended b r i e f ; and 
(3) the case would be r e - c a l e n d a r e d for argument on the C o u r t ' s 
March, 1986 c a l e n d a r . 
This amended brief is filed in compliance with that order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Richard Lynn Wright, was charged with two 
counts of aggravated robbery, first degree felonies, and two 
counts of aggravated kidnapping, first degree felonies. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial 
grounds, and the motion was heard and denied in a pre-trial 
hearing on March 22, 1985, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde 
presiding. 
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial held June 14-
17, 19 85, of two counts of aggravated robbery in the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable David E. Roth, presiding. Judge Roth sentenced 
defendant to a term in the Utah State Prison of not less than 
five years but which may be for life for each conviction to run 
concurrently. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 8, 1976, at approximately 2:00 a.m., two 
Weber County Sheriff Deputies approached defendant who was parked 
in an orange Corvette on a secluded road (T. 148-150). Deputy 
Michael Schlosser requested defendants driver1 s license and 
vehicle registration. When he could not produce the registra-
tion, he was asked to step out of the vehicle (T. 150). Deputy 
Hartman interrogated him (T. 187), while Schlosser walked back to 
the patrol vehicle to run an NCIC check on the vehicle and the 
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defendant (T. 152) • 1 Hartman was wri t ing the defendant 's 
responses on a f i e l d in te r roga t ion card when he looked up and saw 
the defendant pointing a small ca l iber handgun a t him (T. 188-
190). Defendant to ld Hartman to do as he said or he would k i l l 
him (T. 189). He placed the weapon against the o f f i c e r ' s r ibs 
(T. 190). Defendant then yel led to Schlosser f "I have got a gun 
in your buddy's back. If you make any funny moves I w i l l k i l l 
him (T. 154). Defendant handcuffed Schlosser ' s and Hartman's 
hands behind t h e i r backs, and ordered them to kneel down and 
cross the i r ankles in back, threatening Hartman to "do exactly 
as I say or I w i l l blow your head off here" (T. 194). Defendant 
came behind them holding Schlosser ' s .357 Magnum and cocked the 
t r igge r back (T. 157). Schlosser reasoned with him to l e t them 
go. Defendant to ld them to " s t a r t walking over toward the r iver" 
(T. 157) . As the deputies began walking/ Schlosser saw defendant 
ins ide the patrol car taking out the i r shotgun. Schlosser to ld 
Hartman to run. Hartman ran and f e l l , s t r ik ing h i s forehead and 
sus ta in ing a severe concussion (T. 197-200). The deputies 
eventually obtained ass is tance from brakemen of a nearby t r a i n . 
Five days l a t e r , s t i l l suffering from the concussion 
and resu l t ing complications, Hartman iden t i f i ed a Leonard Wright 
as the individual responsible for the crime (T. 201-202). 
However, Leonard Wright was released a few days l a t e r af ter 
Schlosser pos i t ive ly iden t i f i ed the defendant as the a s sa i l an t 
1
 Defendant was apparently a federal probationer a t the time who 
had absconded from probation supervision (R. 82). 
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from a photographic spread (T. 164).2 
On September 28, 1976f defendant was apprehended while 
driving an orange Corvette in Kamloopsf British Columbia by 
Corporal Beason and another officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police. During the arrest, defendant fired a shot at one of the 
Canadian officers (T. 254). He was subdued and Beason removed 
two .357 Magnum firearms from defendant's possession. These were 
later identified as belonging to Schlosser and Hartman (T. 268-
270). Defendant also threatened the Canadian officers at the 
police station and was kneed in the stomach. He was then placed 
in a holding cell (T. 238). 
Beason interviewed the defendant the following day 
about the Weber County incident, first informing him that he did 
not have to say anything, but if he did, it would be given in 
evidence against him (T. 270). Defendant indicated he understood 
and gave a written confession concerning the Weber County 
incident (R. 271). 
The defendant was subsequently convicted of numerous 
unrelated offenses in Canada, receiving a twenty-year sentence in 
the British Columbia Penitentiary (R. 72). The record 
establishes that Weber County did not file any charges against 
z
 Defendant claims that charges were filed against Leonard Wright 
in September, 1976 and a preliminary hearing was held. No 
evidence was offered to substantiate the latter claim and no 
transcripts of a preliminary hearing were available for the 
pretrial hearing or for trial (T2. 293, 298, 300) (T. 202). At 
the pretrial hearing, the prosecutor said that as the case was 
set for preliminary hearing it was dismissed against Leonard 
Wright (T2. 319). Officer Schlosser did not recall a preliminary 
hearing ever being held (T. 178). 
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the defendant while he was serving his Canadian sentence nor 
lodge a detainer with any corrections authorities during the 
period of his incarceration between 1976 and 1984.4 Canada is 
not signatory to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. See 11 
Uniform Laws Ann. 170 (Supp. 1985). In October of 1978, pursuant 
to the Canadian-American Prisoner Exchange Program, defendant was 
transferred to the federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois 
(R. 72) .5 In September of 1979, defendant was transferred to 
California pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to 
face state criminal charges there. After completion of those 
proceedings, he was returned to Marion, Illinois, apparently to 
continue his federal sentence (R. 71, 81-83). In June of 1982, 
defendant was transferred to the Utah State Prison apparently to 
complete his sentence as a federal prisoner (R. 72, 82-83). 
4
 The only charging documents in the record are those filed 
against the defendant in 1985 (R. 1-15). The only reference to 
any detainer supposedly being lodged is in a letter from 
defendant's federal probation officer dated August 31, 1983, 
attached to defendant's motion to dismiss filed below (R. 82). 
However, there is no copy of any such detainer in this record. 
The prosecutor's memorandum in reply to the motion to dismiss 
states that "defendant was not arrested nor charged with the 
current violations until the recent filing of the Information 
before the Court . . . in January of 1985" (R. 31). At the pre-
trial motion to dismiss hearing, the prosecutor similarly stated 
that "there was no pending charge against this defendant" until 
January of 1985, and there is no duty on the State to lodge a 
detainer against a suspect (T.2, 378). Defense counsel even 
conceded at the hearing that no detainer had been lodged (T2. 
294) and that charges against defendant were not filed until he 
was later incarcerated in the Utah State Prison (T2. 296). The 
defense merely argued that a complaint had been filed against the 
wrong person, Leonard Eugene Wright (T2. 293, 298, 330-331). 
5
 The record does not disclose whether the defendant was 
thereafter incarcerated to serve the balance of his Canadian 
sentence, to serve the balance of a prior federal sentence, or to 
serve time on new federal convictions (R. 72, 82) (T2. 294). 
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He was advised by Utah Prison authorities of his speedy trial 
rights and the right to make a demand to have any untried charges 
disposed of and how to assert those rights (T2. 307-309, 312). 
He signed an acknowledgement of having been so advised (R. 30, 
84) (T2. 305-306r 310)• 
At no time between 1976 and January, 1985 did defendant 
contact Weber County officials to inquire as to the status of any 
case which might be pending against him (T2. 300, 318, 322-323, 
334) . 
He was arraigned on the present charges in January, 
1985. He moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds on 
March 11, 1985. The matter came on for hearing on March 22, 1985 
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde. Defendant presented no 
evidence at said hearing and merely argued his motion. Judge 
Hyde denied the motion (T2. 33-334). Defendant was convicted of 
two counts of aggravated robbery in a jury trial held on June 14-
17, 1985. 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
The record establishes that Weber County did not file 
charges against the defendant until January, 1985. Trial 
commenced June of 1985. No speedy trial issue is present in this 
case. The defendant has not claimed a denial of due process 
rights based upon a theory of pre-accusation or pre-arrest delay 
in this appeal. Should this Court reach that issue, no due 
process rights were violated because the record neither 
establishes substantial prejudice to defendant nor intentional 
delay designed to gain tactical advantage over him. Assuming 
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defendant 's speedy t r i a l claims could be reached, h i s r igh t to 
a speedy t r i a l was not v iola ted because the purposes behind the 
cons t i tu t iona l speedy t r i a l provisions are not present in t h i s 
case. Assuming they are present , when factors such as length of 
the delay, reasons for the delay, the lack of any request for a 
speedy t r i a l and the lack of a showing of actual prejudice are 
weighed, there was no denial of speedy t r i a l r igh ts in t h i s case. 
Prosecution of the defendant was not barred by Utah's 
Detainer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1982), because no charges 
were pending against defendant upon which a request for 
d ispos i t ion of a detainer could be made unt i l 1985. Ev,en if 
charges had previously been f i l ed and a detainer lodged, 
defendant made no request for d ispos i t ion of the Weber County 
charges so as to t r igger the running of the time l i m i t s for 
prosecution under Utah's Detainer Act. 
The s t a tu t e of l im i t a t i ons was to l l ed during the time 
the defendant was out of the S ta t e , and thus did not bar his 
prosecution. 
Defendant's confession to the Weber County offenses to 
Canadian of f icers was properly admitted into evidence by the 
lower court . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS FEDERAL 
OR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
The United Sta tes Supreme Court in United S ta tes v. 
MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 (1982), held tha t the federal 
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constitutional right to a speedy trial "attaches only when a 
formal criminal charge is instituted and a criminal prosecution 
begins" and "does not apply to the period before a defendant is 
indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused." Citing 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 3 07, 313 (1971), the Court 
said: 
On its face, the protection of the [Sixth] 
Amendment is activated only when a criminal 
prosecution has begun and extends only to 
those persons who have been "accused" in the 
course of that prosecution. These provisions 
would seem to afford no protection to those 
not yet accused, nor would they seem to 
require the Government to discover, 
investigate, and accuse any person within any 
particular period of time. 
The MacDonald Court noted that delay prior to arrest or indictment 
may give rise to a due process claim or to a claim under any 
applicable statute of limitations, but that no right to a speedy 
trial arises until charges are pending. Xd. at 7-8. SJ£& .aL&Q 
United States v. Loud Hawk, U.S. , 38 Cr.L. 3075 
(Jan. 21, 1986); and State V, Bailey, No. 19812, slip op. at 3-4) 
(Utah Supreme Court, Dec. 31, 1985). ££. Speedy Trial Act of 
1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(d), 3161(h)(6). 
The record in t h i s case e s t ab l i shes t h a t Weber County 
prosecutors did not f i l e charges agains t the defendant pr ior to 
January of 1985 (R. 1-15, 31)(T2. 296, 328), and defendant does 
not complain of the six-month delay in bringing him to t r i a l af ter 
the 1985 informations were f i l e d . Nor does he a s se r t a claim of 
pre-accusat ion or p re -a r r e s t delay on due process grounds other 
than his statute of limitations argument which is treated 
elsewhere in this brief. 
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His e n t i r e argument on appeal i s a speedy t r i a l claim 
based upon the unsupported premise tha t Weber County f i l ed charges 
against him sometime when he was in custody on h i s Canadian 
convict ions. The record contains no such e a r l i e r charging 
documents, or copies of any detainers which might have been lodged 
with any correct ions o f f i c i a l s between 1976 and 1984. The only 
reference to a detainer possibly being f i l ed i s a tangent ia l 
reference in a l e t t e r from a federal probation off icer which was 
apparently attached to defendant 's motion to dismiss (R. 82) . 
There i s no ind ica t ion t h i s l e t t e r was ever offered in to evidence 
in any lower court proceedings. The prosecutor in h is memorandum 
in reply to defendant 's motion to dismiss s t a t ed : "defendant was 
not a r res ted nor charged with the current v io la t ions [sic] un t i l 
the recent f i l i n g of the Information . . . in January of 1985" 
(R. 31) . The prosecutor made s imilar representat ions a t the pre-
t r i a l hearing on the motion to dismiss, and defense counsel even 
conceded t ha t no charges had been f i l ed against defendant nor 
de ta iners lodged pr ior to tha t time (T2. 294, 296, 328). The 
charging documents in the record on appeal supports t h i s view 
(R. 1-15). This Court should therefore not reach the merits of 
defendant 's speedy t r i a l claims which are supported only by his 
own, unsubstantiated and se l f -serv ing factual a l lega t ions in his 
brief on appeal . 
Although defendant has not framed the issue as one of 
denial of due process based upon pre-accusation or p r e - a r r e s t 
delay, should t h i s Court choose to reach the i s sue , no v io la t ion 
of due process occurred in t h i s case. 
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In United Sta tes v, Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), the 
Supreme Court noted tha t s t a t u t e s of l im i t a t i ons are the primary 
guarantee against the bringing of overly s t a l e charges (404 U.S. 
a t 322), but tha t due process may require dismissal of charges if 
the defense can show at t r i a l t ha t the pre-accusat ion, pre-
indictment or p r e - a r r e s t delay caused "subs tant ia l prejudice" to 
the defendant 's r i gh t to a f a i r t r i a l .and tha t "the delay was an 
in ten t iona l device to gain t a c t i c a l advantage over the accused." 
404 U.S. at 324. These quest ions must be decided "on the 
circumstances of each case ." 404 U.S. a t 325. The Court 
concluded t h a t the defendants had nei ther al leged nor proved 
actual prejudice and there was no showing the Government 
i n t en t iona l ly delayed to gain some t a c t i c a l advantage over them or 
to harass them. Xd. 
in United States v, Lovasco, 431 u.s. 783 (1977)
 f the 
Supreme Court found tha t even where a defendant might e s t ab l i sh 
actual prejudice a t t r i a l from pre-accusation delay, t h i s merely 
makes the due process issue concrete and r ipe for adjudicat ion 
(431 U.S. at 789), and the reasons for the delay must also be 
considered. Xd. a t 790. The Court refused to adopt a rule 
requir ing prosecutors to f i l e charges as soon as they are l ega l ly 
e n t i t l e d to do so or once they have assembled su f f i c i en t evidence 
to prove g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt. Xd. at 792-794. Such 
a ru le would not take in to account "a wide range of fac tors in 
addi t ion to the s trength of the Government's case, in order to 
determine whether prosecution would be in the publ ic i n t e r e s t . " 
Xd. at 7 94. One such factor c i ted by the Court was the 
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" a v a i l a b i l i t y and l ikel ihood of prosecution by another j u r i s -
d i c t i on . " Xd. n. 15. (This s i t ua t i on was c lear ly present in the 
ins tan t case.) Applying due process p r inc ip les of fundamental 
f a i r n e s s , the Lovasco Court refused to find a due process 
v io la t ion despi te defendants1 showing of prejudice (the death of 
two mater ia l witnesses during the period of the de lay) . 
In S ta te v. Bailey. No. 19812, s l i p op. at 3-4 (Utah 
Supreme Courtf Dec. 31 , 1985), a p re -a r re s t delay case f the 
defendant claimed prejudice because of the loss of contact with 
two a l i b i wi tnesses . This Court applied the t e s t s es tabl ished in 
Marion and Lovasco requiring t ha t defendant show "substant ia l 
actual prejudice" and " in tent ional delay designed to produce an 
advantage for the prosecut ion." No due process v io la t ion was 
found. 
In the present case, the r equ i s i t e showing of substan-
t i a l prejudice so as to make the due process issue "concrete and 
r ipe for adjudicat ion ," Lovasco. 431 U.S. at 489, has not been 
made. Defendant merely furnished h is own se l f -serv ing aff idavi t 
with h i s motion to dismiss a l leging tha t an a l i b i witness had died 
and another had become seni le during the period of the delay 
(R. 26-27, 29) . He offered no evidence a t the p r e - t r i a l hearing 
or a t t r i a l to subs tan t i a te t h i s claim. No death c e r t i f i c a t e s or 
medical repor ts were submitted. Defense counsel even indicated he 
was uncertain when the one witness had died (T2. 301). At t r i a l , 
the defendant merely made a "statement," not under oath, tha t 
(1) he l e f t Cal ifornia with an unknown male person (he could not 
remember h is name); (2) he went to Arizona to stay with h is uncle 
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and mother; (3) while the re , a friend borrowed h is car, drove to 
Utah, and returned with guns which he gave to the defendant; 
(4) h is uncle died in 1980 and h i s mother has become s e n i l e ; 
(5) while in Arizona, he had a g i r l f r i end and two male fr iends but 
he could not remember t h e i r names; and (6) his ex-wife, who police 
interviewed regarding t h i s case, had also died (T. 132-134)• 
Defendant offered no evidence to subs tan t i a t e any aspect of t h i s 
"statement" and fa i led to even explain what evidence these 
witnesses may have provided. The S ta te refuted defendant 's 
"statement" by introducing evidence of defendant 's confession to 
the Utah crimes to Canadian a u t h o r i t i e s (T. 271), and the property 
of the Weber County s h e r i f f ' s o f f ice rs found in defendant 's 
possession when he was a r res ted in Canada (T. 268-270). 
Defendant also claims prejudice because of h i s 
purported i n a b i l i t y to loca te and subpoena Leonard Wright, the 
person i n i t i a l l y iden t i f i ed by one of the vict ims as the 
a s s a i l a n t , and the disappearance of photographs of Leonard Wright 
and unava i l ab i l i ty of t r a n s c r i p t s of a preliminary hearing 
purportedly held for Leonard Wright. F i r s t , there i s nothing in 
the record to e s t ab l i sh to what extent attempts were ac tua l ly made 
by the defense to loca te and subpoena Leonard Wright (T. 134). 
Second, the record r e f l e c t s tha t the defense apparently did not 
even attempt to loca te any photographs of Leonard Wright pr ior to 
making a surpr i se request for them on the prosecutor a t the outset 
of t r i a l (T. 139) . F ina l ly , as noted e a r l i e r , the record does not 
e s t ab l i sh tha t a preliminary hearing was ever held for Leonard 
Wright. Rather, i t appears t ha t charges were dismissed against 
him before the preliminary hearing s tage . 
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Even assuming t ha t defendant has made a suff ic ient 
showing of " subs tan t i a l n pre judice , there i s nothing to indica te 
t ha t the Government's delay in t h i s case was in ten t iona l to gain a 
t a c t i c a l advantage over the accused. At the p r e - t r i a l hearing the 
defense conceded i t had no spec i f ic f ac t s to e s t ab l i sh tha t the 
delay was de l ibera te or purposeful (T2. 295, 297). The prosecutor 
offered no explanation for the delay other than defendant 's 
obvious incarcera t ion on a Canadian conviction with a twenty-
year sentence and the lack of a detainer agreement with Canada 
(T2. 325). Judge Hyde expressly found no de l ibera te delay in t h i s 
case (T2. 334). 
Based on the foregoing, defendant was not denied due 
process of law by the pre-accusat ion and p re -a r re s t delay in t h i s 
case. 
Should t h i s Court somehow find t ha t charges were, in 
f ac t , pending against defendant before 1985, so that defendant 's 
speedy t r i a l claims might be reached, there has been no v io la t ion 
of h i s r ight to a speedy t r i a l under the fac t s of t h i s case. 
The r igh t to a speedy t r i a l i s guaranteed in the U.S. 
Const i tu t ion, Amendment VI; Utah Const i tu t ion, Art. I . , § 12. 
£££ jcLLaa Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (f) (1953), as amended. 
The r ight i s : 
. . . not primarily intended to prevent 
prejudice to the defense caused by passage of 
time; that interest is protected primarily by 
the Due Process Clause and by statutes of 
limitations. The speedy trial guarantee is 
designed to minimize the possibility of 
lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to 
reduce the lesser, but nevertheless 
substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on 
an accused while released on bail, and to 
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shorten the disruption of life caused by 
arrest and the presence of unresolved 
criminal charges. 
United States v. MacDonald. 456 U.S. at 8. The focus is on the 
impairment or "restraint on personal libertyf disruption of 
employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public 
obloquy. . . . " Xd. at 9. £££ a±£& United States v. Marion, 404 
U.S. at 320. Similarly, in State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 145, 506 
P.2d 67, 68 (1973), this Court noted that: 
The right to a speedy trial assured by our 
Constitutions refers, of course, not to the 
speed at which a trial proceeds, but rather 
to the right of an accused to be brought to 
trial without undue delay. This is a right 
of ancient origin which arose because of 
abuses wherein people were kept in custody 
for unreasonable periods of time without 
trial and even without knowing any abuse of 
that character. But in the absence thereof, 
it should not be extended as a mere abstrac-
tion of law in circumstances where there is 
no justification for its application. The 
statement itself is general and there is no 
particular length of time which can be 
specified as a standard in all instances in 
order to avoid infringement of the right. 
The correct application of the principle 
depends upon the facts of each case. The 
total picture should be looked at to see 
whether there has been any such abuse of 
imposition upon the accused as the provision 
was designed to protect against, so that he 
was prejudiced in having a fair trial and 
just treatment under the law. 
In State V. Archuletta, 577 P.2d 547, 548 (Utah 1977), this Court 
stated: 
The purpose of those constitutional 
provisions is to guard against any 
intentional delay which may be oppressive 
or persecutorial in nature. U.S. v. Ewellf 
383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed. 627 
(1966) . 
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Host of the concerns behind speedy t r i a l provisions do 
not appear to be present in the ins tan t case. Assuming Weber 
County had f i l e d charges as ear ly as 1976 as defendant suggests, 
there was no oppressive p r e - t r i a l incarcera t ion stemming from 
such charges. Rather, the defendant was incarcerated on numerous 
unrelated convictions in other j u r i s d i c t i o n s . Under such 
circumstances, the concerns of loss of l i b e r t y , disrupt ion of 
employment, s t r a i n on f inancia l resources and exposure to public 
obloquy are c lear ly non-exis tent . More-over, the defendant 
ce r ta in ly was aware of the Utah offenses and even confessed to 
them to Canadian o f f i c i a l s in l a t e 1976, yet he expressed no 
desire over the eight-year period to have them resolved. Any 
concern t h a t h i s defense might be jeopardized by the delay was 
perhaps outweighed by h i s hope tha t the delay would minimize the 
chances of the charges ever being f i l e d or his being brought to 
t r i a l . 
Assuming the purposes behind the speedy t r i a l 
provisions were present in t h i s case, the fac ts of each case 
should be reviewed. The United Sta tes Supreme Court has noted 
tha t whether the federal speedy t r i a l r ight has been v io la ted i s 
determined by balancing the n . . . length of delay, the reason 
for the delay, the defendant 's asse r t ion of h i s r i gh t , and 
prejudice to the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 
530 (1972). Similar considerat ions also apply under the Utah 
Const i tu t ion. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Utah 1984); 
Sta te V. Knillr 656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1982); S ta te v. 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982); S ta te v. Hafen. 593 
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P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1979); State v. Giles, Utahf 576 P.2d 876, 
879 (1978). This Court elaborated on the above factors in £taJ^ 
v. Weddle, 506 P.2d at 68, as follows: 
In making that determination, where there 
has been what may appear to be undue delay, 
it is important to consider whether or not 
there was justification for it including: 
(1) which party caused it; (2) whether it 
may have been wilful and/or for some improper 
purpose; (3) whether the defendant was aware 
of his rights; (4) whether he made known 
his desire for a speedy trial; (5) whether 
by words or conduct there was explicit or 
implicit waiver: and (6) whether the pro-
ceeding was completed as soon as reasonably 
could be done in the circumstances. 
Those factors, of course, assume that the delay occurs 
after charges are filed—a situation which has not been 
established in this case. Assuming the charges had been filed, 
an application of these factors demonstrates no violation of 
defendant's speedy t r i a l r ights . 
1 . LENGTH QF DELAY. 
Although the purported delay in this case was lengthy, 
(over eight years), the Supreme Court in Barker stressed there is 
no precise point at which the delay becomes prejudicial per ££• 
Rather, the inquiry must be determined on an ad hoc basis 
considering the circumstances of each case. Xd* at 530-31. 
In Barkerf the delay between arrest and trial was over five 
years, but because of countervailing factors, the conviction was 
upheld. The same result should be reached in this case. 
2. REASONS FOR THE DELAY. 
There were valid reasons for the delays by the 
government given all of the circumstances. Moreover, the delays 
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could also be deemed attributable to acts of the defendant. 
In Barker, the Supreme Court stated: 
Closely related to length of delay is 
the reason the government assigns to justify 
the delay. Here, toof different weights 
should be assigned to different reasons. 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in 
order to hamper the defense should be weighed 
heavily against the government. A more 
neutral reason such as negligence or 
overcrowded courts should be weighed less 
heavily but nevertheless should be considered 
since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the government 
rather than with the defendant. Finally, .a 
valid reason, such as a missing witness, 
should serve to justify appropriate delay* 
(Footnote omitted, emphasis added.) 
407 U.S. at 531. &£& al££ United States v, Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 
120 (1966) (the right of speedy trial is consistent with 
appropriate delay). And in State V, Archuletta, 577 P.2d 547 
(Utah 1977), referring to the right of speedy trial, this Court 
stated: 
The purpose of those cons t i tu t iona l 
provisions i s to guard against any 
in ten t iona l delay which may be oppressive 
or persecutor ia l in na ture . . . . [T]he 
court does not lose j u r i s d i c t i o n . . . 
unless there i s some in ten t iona l delay 
of an oppressive character , which r e s u l t s 
in prejudice to the defendant! .] 
I d . a t 548-49. 
Also, the rule is firmly established that any delay attributable 
to the defendant should not be considered in determining whether 
his right to a speedy trial was denied. .£££ State v. Weddle, 506 
P.2d at 68; State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d at 116, (under former 
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Utah s t a t u t e b requir ing t h a t a prisoner be brought to t r i a l within 
90 days, where defendant himself has requested a continuance, the 
d ispos i t ion period sha l l "be extended by the amount of time during 
which defendant himself has created de lay") . S ta te v. Kelly, 123 
Ariz. 24, 597 P.2d 177, 179 (1979) (any delay occasioned by 
defendant i s excluded time under speedy t r i a l r u l e ) ; and 
Cherniwchan v. S t a t e , 594 P.2d 464, 468 (Wyo. 1979) (defendant may 
be d i s e n t i t l e d to speedy- t r ia l safeguards where the delay i s a l l 
or pa r t l y the r e spons ib i l i t y of the defendant) . 
Mr. Wright fled the j u r i s d i c t i o n of not only Weber 
County, but of Utah and the United S t a t e s . He then committed 
fur ther offenses in Canada which led to h i s apprehension, 
conviction and incarcera t ion in t h a t foreign country where he 
received a twenty-year prison sentence. While serving the i n i t i a l 
two years of tha t sentence, he was beyond Utah 's j u r i s d i c t i o n 
which ef fec t ive ly precluded Weber County from commencing i t s 
prosecut ion. In October, 1978, he was t rans fe r red to the United 
Sta tes under the Canadian-American Prisoner Exchange program and 
served time in federal prison a t Marion, I l l i n o i s . 
Arguably, Utah might have been able at that time to 
obtain jurisdiction to try him under Article IV of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (IAD), Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1982) had 
charges been filed. However, the defendant could also have 
demanded disposition of any Utah detainer under Article III of the 
IAD. He made no efforts in this regard. Moreover, the record is 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (1953) ( repea led 1980) . 
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complaintf but deferred prosecuting their case until the Davis 
County charges were resolved. The defendants claimed a denial of 
their speedy trial rights to which this Court responded as 
follows: 
It was through their own conduct that they 
were confined in the jail in Davis County 
awaiting trial for the crime of murder. 
In that proceeding they were represented by 
counsel. They had been served with warrants 
in this case and knew that it was pending 
against them. It is reasonable to assume 
that they knew of their legal rights. 
Nevertheless, it does not appear that they 
indicated any desire to expedite the 
proceedings in this case until the notice 
filed by defendant Weddle on February 22, 
1972. We see nothing unreasonable about the 
Weber County authorities deferring to Davis 
County and not interfering therewith until 
that charge was disposed of. More impor-
tantly , we do not see how the defendants were 
in any way prejudiced by the delay which 
occurred. It is to be noted that when that 
proceeding was completed, and demand was made 
by the defendants/ the proceedings in this 
case moved with reasonable expedition. There 
is certainly nothing made to appear which 
would warrant the abrogation of the serious 
charge of robbery of which the defendants 
stand convicted. 
From the foregoing, there are no facts which would 
indicate that the State1s actions were intentionally oppressive, 
dilatory, willful, for an improper purpose, or negligent. 
Moreover, the delay was partially attributable to acts of the 
defendant. 
3. DEFENDANT'S EFFORTS TQ ASSERT HIS RIGHT. 
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972), the 
Supreme Court pointed out that the right to a speedy trial is 
different from other constitutional rights, in that the 
deprivat ion of tha t r igh t may in fact work to the defendant 's 
advantage. The Court further s t a t ed : 
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Delay i s not an uncommon defense t a c t i c . 
As the time between the commission of the 
crime and t r i a l lengthens* witnesses may 
become unavailable or t h e i r memories may 
fade. If the witnesses support the 
prosecution/ i t s case wi l l be weakened/ 
sometimes ser iously so. And i t i s the 
prosecution which ca r r i e s the burden of 
proof. Thus,- unlike the r igh t to counsel or .. 
the r ight to be free from compelled self-
incr iminat ion, deprivation of the r igh t to 
speedy t r i a l does not per se prejudice the 
accused 's a b i l i t y to defend himself, 
i d . at 521-2?, Consequently, an important fact-, r in de^idin^ 
whether there hau bee i :i, a ; - ;L 
wnether :.rv. defendant has maae effort;.. \. asser t t h i s r igh t , 
-* • ie^cndanu na& uu a::r ' ' r i n g 
himseu., LI*. ^ _ ^ean, however ^ne 
defendant ? _.- r responsibi l i ty t • a s se r t h is riq: •- al 5?7r 
Int n ui h±o effor t s M i l l be 
<-*%:ed * . Lwu length of the delay, to some 
..., b\ the reason for the delay, and most 
pa r t i cu la r ly by the personal prejudice, which 
i s not a 1 ways readi ly identifiable,- t hat he • 
experiences. The more serious the 
deprivation/ the more l i ke ly a defendant i s 
to compiain. The defendant 's asser t ion of 
h i s speedy t r i a l r igh t , then, i s e n t i t l e d to 
a strong evident iary weight in determ.ini.ng 
whether the defendant i s being deprived of 
the r i gh t . We emphasize tha t f a i l u r e to 
3LS asLLt the r igh t wi l l make i t d i f f i c u l t for-a 
defendant to prove tha t he was denied a 
speedy t r i a l * (Emphasis added.) 
J Li at !J. JI •-.*<!. 
Si r i i . i lar ly f t h i s C o u r t ha s s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t 
in i,:i s t a s s e i: t h :i s i: I g h t t o a s pe e dy t r i a. ] S i a tfi l • L a i r b y , 6 9 9 
P. 2d 118 7, ] 19] (Utal :i. 1 98 4) ; Stfa££_5£*_Kiii 1 1 6. i 3 2- :1 ] C 2:1: ,„ 1 : 
(Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ; and S t a t e v . M e n z i e s , 601 P.2d. 925 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) . 
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This Court has also recognized t h a t a defendant may impl ic i t ly or 
e x p l i c i t l y waive h i s r ight to a speedy t r i a l through words or 
conduct. Weddle. 506 P.2d a t 68. 
Defendant argues tha t even though he did not request 
d i spos i t ion of the charges t h a t were purportedly pending against 
him, ". . . the reasons for the invocation of the speedy t r i a l 
guarantee are j u s t as compelling." He c i t e s Dickey v. F lo r ida . 
398 U.S. 30 (1970). But in Mskey, the defendant made d i l i gen t 
and repeated e f fo r t s by motions in the S ta te courts to secure a 
prompt d ispos i t ion of the charges pending agains t him. The Court 
also found t h a t the defendant was ava i lab le to the S ta te a t a l l 
times during the seven-year period before he was brought to t r i a l . 
In 1962 Dickey f i l ed a p e t i t i o n s ty led "Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad 
Prosequendum" naming the Sta te Attorney as respondent and asking 
t h a t he be required to show cause why he should not be ordered to 
e i ther take the steps necessary to obtain Dickey's presence for 
t r i a l or withdraw the detainer for f a i l u r e to provide Dickey with 
a speedy t r i a l . Dickey f i l e d papers ra i s ing subs t an t i a l l y the 
same contentions on two l a t e r occasions: Apri l f 1963 and March, 
1966. Dickey next pe t i t ioned the Supreme Court of Florida to 
issue a wri t of mandamus ordering the Ci rcui t Court to e i the r 
secure h i s re turn for t r i a l or withdraw the detainer agains t him. 
Dickey again f i l ed in September of 1967. The United S ta tes 
Supreme Court reversed Mr. Dickey's subsequent conviction because 
of these repeated e f f o r t s . Defendant's lack of even a s ingle 
ef for t to a s se r t h i s r ight to a speedy t r i a l or f i l e under the 
I n t e r s t a t e Agreement on Detainers i s c lear ly d i s t ingu i shab le . 
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evidence of actual prejudice. Defendant offers no evidence of 
actual prejudice, simply stating that his alibi witnesses have 
become permanently unavailable (R. 132-133) . He alleges an uncle, 
Earl Pidge, died in 1980. He offered no death certificate into 
evidence. There is also no explanation of why Mr. Pidge's 
statement could not have been obtained between 1976 and 19 80 
(assuming charges were pending against defendant at that time). 
Defendant contends his other alibi witness, Mrs. Velma Wright, his 
mother, became senile in 1980 (R. 133). Again, defendant fails to 
offer documentation or medical records to substantiate his claim. 
The defendant finally argues he had three friends who would have 
been helpful to his defense but he has forgotten their names and 
addresses. 
Defendant's allegation of being denied the opportunity 
of asserting and proving an alibi defense must be balanced against 
defendant's confession to the crime to Canadian authorities. 
United States v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 936 (1966). Also, when 
apprehended in Canada, he was in possession of the firearms taken 
from the Weber County deputies (R. 141). Finally, the prejudice 
factor should be evaluated in light of the fact the defendant 
himself did not appear to desire a speedy trial until he moved to 
dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds in 1985. It is 
reasonable to suspect he thought the delay would work to his 
advantage. 
This Court has repeatedly refused to reverse 
convictions where the defendant has failed to establish any 
specific or real prejudice, i&e e.g.. State v. Lairby. 699 P.2d 
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1 ct p^ q e . 
v:-."; : . . ' -J:-.J: . ^- DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
••:". BY UTAH'S DETAINER ACTr 
• /ODF AKN. ?: 77 -29 -1 (1982) • 
U t a h ' s D e t a i n e r Ac t , Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 - 2 9 - 1 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 
(1) Whenever a p r i s o n e r i s s e r v i n g a 
t • =!' i: i i i o f imp r i s o nme n t i n the s t a t e p r i s o n , 
j a :i ] or o t h e r pena 1 or cor r e c t i ona 1 
i i Ist:ii t u t i o n of t h i s s t a t e , and t h e r e i s 
pei idi i lg a g a i n s t t h e p r i s o n e r i n t h i s s t a t e 
any u n t r i e d i n d i c t m e n t or i n f o r m a t i o n , and 
t h e p r i s o n e r s h a l l d e l i v e r t o the warden , 
s h e r i f f or c u s t o d i a l o f f i c e r i n a u t h o r i t y , 
any a p p r o p r i a t e a g e n t of t h e same, a w r i t t e n 
demand s p e c i f y i n g the n a t u r e of the cha rge 
and t h e c o u r t w h e r e i n i t i s p e n d i n g and 
r e q u e s t i n g d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e 'pending c h a r g e , 
he s h a l l be e n t i t ] ed t o have t h e c h a r g e 
brought t o t r i a l w i t h i n 120 days of the " . 
of d e l i v e r y of w r i t t e n n o t i c e . 
(2) Any warden, s h e r i f f or c u s t o d i a 
o f f i c e r , upon reques t of the demand d e b c u ^ d 
i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 1 ) , s h a l l immediate ly c ause 
t h e demand t o be f o rwarded by p e r s o n a l 
d e l i v e r y or c e r t i f i e d m a i l , r e t u r n r e c 
r e q u e s t e d , to t h e a p p r o p r i a t e pro--T-* j 
a t t o r n e y and c o u r t c l e r k . 
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As noted in Point I , jsmyLSf the record in t h i s case 
e s t ab l i shes tha t no "untried indictment or information" was 
"pending" agains t Mr* Wright un t i l charges were f i l ed by Weber 
County in January of 1985 (R. 1-15) . Thus, un t i l tha t timef there 
was no bas is upon which a request for d ispos i t ion of a "pending 
charge" could have been made under § 77-29-1. 
There i s also nothing in the record to ind ica te t ha t 
defendant ever submitted the r e q u i s i t e wr i t ten demand request ing 
d ispos i t ion of any pending charge, in order to t r igger the 
provisions of § 77-29-1, a t any time during h i s incarcera t ion in 
the Utah S ta te Prison. Such a request i s c lear ly required to 
commence the running of the 120-day period. S ta te v. Vi les , 
702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985). 
Defendant claims tha t a federal probation o f f i c e r ' s 
l e t t e r of inquiry to the Weber County At torney 's Office dated 
August 31 , 1983 (R. 82) s a t i s f i e d the not ice and request 
requirements of § 77-29-1 . That l e t t e r was wr i t t en over a year 
before charges were ac tua l ly pending and f a l l s miserably short of 
the formal wr i t ten demand required by the s t a t u t e . State v. 
iLil^Sf I d . I t was nothing more than a l e t t e r indica t ing tha t the 
federal probation off icer had f i l e d a probation v i o l a t o r ' s 
deta iner against Mr. Wright and a court in Cal ifornia was in the 
process of evaluating the appropriateness of t he i r re ta in ing t h a t 
de ta ine r . Accordingly, he was attempting to determine for the 
6
 The record does ind ica te t ha t defendant was advised by Utah 
prison o f f i c i a l s of the procedures for invoking the provisions of 
the detainer ac t , and t h a t defendant signed an acknowledgment of 
being so advised (R. 30, 84) (T2. 305-306, 308, 310). 
-26-
d i o not . **_* : ~ :.. ^qui rement s ^f :r,* s t a t u t e « ^a j 
•v ... 1 ; %ierud.iu b ^ t t , i } J : . :. **i \,v. ~.
 t I. .* j r : trl . i . l i a i s e . W c: *. c 
p u r p o r t e d l y p e n d i n g , and ::i t was neve r s e r v e d on a c o u r t c] e r k . 
Base ::l :)i: 1 t .1: I = • f c >r e g o j :t \gi t h ' = |: i: : :ii s i c: i is : f U tal: i' ' s 
D e t a i ne r Act d i d no t bar t h e pro s e c u t i o n of d e f e n d a n t under t h e 
l a c t s of t h i s c a s e , 
EQ I HI 1 1 1 
3SECUTI0N OF THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ' 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE IF LIMITATIONS, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 1 - 3 0 2 (1) (a) ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 
AS AMENDED, BECAUSE IT WAS TOLLED 
DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME DEPENDANT 
WAS OUT OF THE STATE. 
Utah v j d e Ann. • - . . / . . . i u . . ; a s amended, 
^s ta r . I i rhe.. a t - t a t u t ^ ^ i m i t a t i o n s fo* * e l o n y . 
t h a t : 
The p e r i o d of l i m i t a t i o n does \-*. . 
' . ; : . : t any d e f e n d a n t d u r i n g any p e n o f l 
•/ t ime he i s out of t h e s t a t * f l^-^.-g 
t
.h- commission of an off pp.— 
. I. J hi. L(-i" 
commi s s i o n • •: :. * County of t e n s e s i n : ^pt eraser c : . li ' -
 r 
a n s r e r . !i Ml „i 
t ime , f t -der^: s e n t e n c e . A c e - i l l } ; . : t i:> Utar, p r i s o n ' s 
- ar, St- - ' 
t i x a ^ nea , . .
 : i t L.IUU *'s in o 11 * ^ x s m i s s ; " c i c r , J a n f 
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arr ived a t the Utah prison on or about June 21 , 1982. Lt. Michael 
Pierson of the Utah Sta te Prison also t e s t i f i e d tha t defendant 
a r r ived a t the prison in June, 1982. There i s no indica t ion t h a t 
he ever se t foot in Utah pr ior to tha t da te . Tr ia l commenced on 
June 14, 1985, three years a f te r h i s a r r i va l back in Utah, and 
well within the four-year s t a t u t e of l im i t a t i ons period. 
Defendant concedes he was out of the j u r i s d i c t i o n 
between September, 1976 and June, 1982, but claims tha t in the 
i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e the s t a t u t e of l im i t a t i ons should be deemed to 
have run because he was incarcerated in other j u r i s d i c t i o n s during 
tha t time. His incarcera t ion was obviously based on h i s own ac t s 
of misconduct. Moreover, the reasons for the absence from the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i s wholly i r r e l evan t for s t a t u t e of l im i t a t i ons 
purposes. £&£ Couture v. Commonwealthy 338 Mass. 31, 153 N.E.2d 
625 (1958) (the period of a person ' s imprisonment in another s t a t e 
or country should be excluded in determining whether h i s 
indictment was barred by the s t a t u t e , though h is departure or 
absence was not vo lun ta ry ) . £££ &Ls& People v. Posten, 108 Cal. 
App. 3d 633, 166 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1980). 
Based on the foregoing, the s t a tu t e of l i m i t a t i o n s was 
not a bar to defendant 's prosecut ion. 
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EQIE2LJ3Z 
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION TO CANADIAN 
AUTHORITIES WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE BY THE LOWER COURT. 
Defendant c3 aims tha* " ^ n f p o : : ^ * * oer 
Com ity o f f e n s e s wh i c h he gave b ,.». 
i m p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d i n to e v i d e n c e •; v i o l a t i o n cr n i s - i -* 
S::i x th Amendmei 11 r::i gl it s it :i:i i fill = • r t : 1: 1 ! °- - i n s t i t u t i o n . 
He c l a i m s t h e c o n f e s s i o n was no * amuLu* - u * *- * ^ f n tx>lice 
c o e r c i o n and t h a t he was r e f u s e d i„-_ r i g h t t_ c o u n s e l p r i o r t o h i s 
Ml ;i ' i in | I : I n " ! - " 0 1 i . 
Y::€ d e f e n s e a p p a r e n t l y f i l e 3 n<~- p r e - t r : ^ " ! mp*--'or! *-o 
c
 ; r r r e s . c t h e de fenda v * '« w >nfess ion . v* ' ** */ o b j e c t i o n ra i r . ed 
was r a l l e • * t e s t i f y on t r ie i r a t t e . ~ - i 4 J ; , 2 0 - 2 1 
Howevei, • ~-* ^~~ — * * — -
 U i e L i i a i , La ^ r ^ s r n , i f A v - r oa re r . ' ; ' 
made a ^ L : U , . . ^ _ ~ e c o n c e r n i n o d e . _: -^ . 
2 2 S 226 ji ^ p r o f f e r was i • : •. •* Tie ju.ku, l a : - : 
v h r t h e i tli* ~  a u i t 
v - „ : *Ar j * t 1 ,. . v i t ! l u . j j i , i i o u i i ' l , . ,. , ^T e 3 
-***A:*^I • J ' - : • /. • e n d e r e d :;.-. e v i d e n c e i n a d m i s s i b l e . He c o n c l u d e d 
i * c wij C L * i \ . zh- i . l i c s s i o n was vc/iui,c J . • . ( ^ J. * • 
The nidge t h e n c r fere*3 ' . .J 3 h e a r i n g o u t r i d e *he p r e s e n c e o: 
o b j e c t e . :>,.* conceded n* :.a J ' ^ ' .« a;, . .-sear 
q u e s t i o n (T. «.«.w . A h e a r i n g was t h e n h e l d ^ u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e 
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Corporal Beasonr a Canadian police officerf testified 
that he approached the defendant who was in an orange Corvette; 
asked him for a driverfs license and vehicle registration; asked 
him to step out of the car; observed a revolver in his waistband 
under his shirt; retrieved the gun; attempted to place him up 
against the police car when a struggle broke out and defendant had 
to be subdued (T. 231-232). Defendant was rendered unconscious in 
the fray (T. 238). He was later placed under arrest (T. 232). 
When defendant was taken to the police office to be 
fingerprinted, he resisted saying "there was nobody there big 
enough to take his prints" (T. 238). The prints had to be 
forcibly taken and when he signed the fingerprint card, he signed 
"John F. Kennedy." Beason then kneed him in the stomach and 
placed him in a holding cell at 4:00 a.m. on September 28, 1976 
(T. 23 8). Beason explained that he did not knee him merely 
because he signed a bogus name on the card, but because "the man 
had attempted to shoot us during the course of the struggle, and . 
. . my patience was a little thin at that time" (T. 251). Beason 
attempted to talk with him at 9:00 a.m. and defendant refused to 
talk (R. 238). Beason met with him again at 4:50 p.m. (T. 238). 
No other officers were present (T. 241, 246). Defendant was told 
he did not have to say anything and anything he said would be used 
in evidence against him (T. 232, 247) . Beason verified that 
Canadian law did not require advising of the right to counsel 
until 1981 (T. 237) . Defendant indicated he understood the 
warning and then confessed to taking the gun from two Utah 
deputies (T. 232-233). Defendant was asked if he had anything to 
-30-
"v-ar-n and he r e p l i e d t h - - .e 
u
 Jt- I U L a* r a i d of hii . * * . * , * .* , : ^ a i : j e s ^r ' t a u * ^ . . . _. a 
, -^ fendant t h e n s i g n e d 3 w r : r t e n staterr .-r* 
Wrignc ais„ t e s t n i c u W^L ..<_ ^ r e s e n c p n, 
~-N" • - *^,/. ^ :>*; e x a c t e d , r e f u t e d much of 0 : f i c e : B e a s o \ r . : 
Miranda A i r M ; j ^ c nia: % t ir*- . :-o: :* . ^ r a*, a *jt> v*~-j fa. , . i a . v. 
them a t tn - . ^ r - ^ , ^ ! - . — • v.ony t a i n t e d a 
p i c t u r e ^ f . . . . . .
 t _ 1 
de fendan t * : . . f e a r e d fc r - . , ; i < , * \ * r a d v i s e d w n a t s o e v e r 
vsi^ was f o r ^ t r j :-
 v-v .. . L a i u , . ; , i a -« - 1 . 
He *: *sed h i s t e s t i m o n ' !* > 1 • :* . :e t n 
O f f i c e r r e a s o n 1 ; : l e o t i m o n y . ntr ^ a i d he ^uci. a u u i i ^ *«-**_, 'drunK a s 
a skunk" v ^ " '- - - ' • *" •* - t a p p r o a c h e d M* '* -
 : * i a d 
been f i re - • T S whe • 1: 1 t .1 1 € 5 ,, ; 
t h e y took - i o sp i r a l o e f o r e t a k i n g h i 11:1 : * ' - .
 l A ^c 
s t a t i o n ( ' 2C'- *~* * -«- ' -^*- smar t a t them" wh-T * f i n g e r p r i n t s 
were t a k e .1 h ' li • 
p o l i c e (T. 25 8 ) , 
Af tn r hem rgumenr c ^ counsel ° * d- r u l e d 
t h a t s t r i c t adlit. 1 ence _ _ ^ ^ 
s t a t e m e n t ;.= •: *^  ar. i t i c e r -r a i o r e i g n c o u n t r y because i- r 
. . - a . , , *' * l i c e u f f , ^ : r I ^ i t e d 
S t a t e s . riLi^vnG^^i . , . a i u ^ a L i ^ " a n . , , •»..:.... 
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There i s no de ter rent effect outside t h i s country. He said the 
i ssue then becomes whether the statement was voluntary (T. 263). 
Considering the re was a s t rugg le ; a shot was f i r ed ; the off icers 
appeared to be threatened; defendant r e s i s t e d when being 
f ingerpr in ted; t he re was no indica t ion of violence in connection 
with any effor t to take s ta tements ; and any statements given 
concerning the Weber County offenses would not have been centra l 
to any inves t iga t ion in Canada and thus would l i k e l y have been 
vo lun ta r i ly given, the judge found under a l l of the f ac t s and 
circumstances, t ha t the statements were made vo lun ta r i ly and were 
admissible (T. 264-265). The defendant 's confession was l a t e r 
admitted in to evidence a t t r i a l (T. 273-274). 
The judge1s rul ing i s amply supported by case law. 
The defendant even concedes tha t "a number of courts have held 
t ha t f a i l u r e of law enforcement o f f i c i a l s in a foreign country to 
give a Miranda warning does not render a confession inadmissible" 
and t h a t n [ t ] h e cases have further held t h a t i t i s necessary to 
look closely a t the voluntar iness of the confession." 
(Appel lant 's brief a t 20) . This i s indeed the prevai l ing view. 
&££ United Sta tes v. Chavarria. 443 F.2d 904 (9th Ci r . 1971); 
State v. Vickers, Wash. App., 604 P.2d 997 (1979); S ta te V, Hayerr 
Wash. App., 613 P.2d 132 (1980); S ta te V. Cranfordr 83 N.M. 294, 
491 P.2d 511 (1971); S ta te v. Ford, 108 Ariz. 404, 499 P.2d 699 
(1972); Johnson v. S t a t e . Okla. Cr . , 448 P.2d 266 (1969); and 
People Vt Helfend/ 1 Cal. App. 3d 873, 82 Cal. Rptr. 295, 307 
(1969). The chief aim of the Miranda exclusionary ru le i s to 
deter United S ta te s police misconduct during i n t e r roga t i ons . 
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Where the police are ~* ? different countrv-
effert would result * on- application of the exclusionar i -.; c 
ChavarriSf -i i i 'ii • ^ c h 7 . : t inf ons 
i s whe ther s t a t e m e n t s give;- 4 ' i x c e i ^ * : ->reig..
 ; ~ ; . -_ . . 
wore v o l u n t a r y , L:Latf v* ?i'\ . . * - » " *?d 29 4*8 7-- i J46 
(1901 " i dial the burdo . . 
v o l un t a r i ne s s , I
 t ^ LL-L^L^ - ,,' : -* • 
TV pvidcr ^r of t h i ~ *'•--*>. «F =un~ar ized a b o v e , c l e a r l y 
e s t a b l i s h e s t h e VuJ a;, L ~I ...-....... 
ca.se h* .• amply s u p p o " Judge R<t:; !;- t j ndmc: oi v o l u n t a r i n e s s . 
»i " " : " r'' v admiLte^ u l i i x u x . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g , d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n shou ld 
. . .:: 3. 
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